How RESIDE grants should be sized: why project underwriting matters
The RESIDE Act tells HUD how big each grant may be, $1 million to $10 million in any year Congress provides at least $100 million, and nothing about how big it should be. That choice decides how many homes the program buys. Tested in a screening model of the Downtown San Jose buildings it would unlock, a formula based on share of cost, paid with no check of need, pays more than their modeled conversion-cost gap at market values. Under a scenario that prices in the law’s affordability rule, it pays too little. Both point the same way: underwrite each project to find its need, and let the formula’s caps limit the award.
Checked against the enacted text of Public Law 119-101 · Updated
The finding
This site’s model finds 10 buildings in Downtown San Jose that fail on financing alone and would pencil with a RESIDE grant. Under the award formula it assumes, 30% of conversion cost capped at $60,000 a home and $10 million a project, they would receive $68.8M. Their combined modeled gap, the difference between what each conversion costs and what the finished homes are worth, is $47.0M. The formula pays 1.5× the gap, $58K a home where $40K would close it. The gap leaves out the cost of buying each building, which RESIDE grants can also pay for, so the real gaps are larger and this surplus is an upper bound.
That is the number published on the San Jose page. This page checks it three ways: against the statute, against a $10 million budget, and against the affordability rule the model leaves out. The first two hold it up. The third turns it around.
What the law says about award size
Section 227(c) sets a range for each grant to a jurisdiction. It sets no rule for sizing a grant to a building.
Section 210 of the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act added Section 227 to the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, the law behind the HOME program. On award size it says two things:
- in a fiscal year with at least $100 million available, each grant “shall be not less than $1,000,000 and not more than $10,000,000”; and
- in a year with less, HUD “shall seek to maximize the number of covered grants awarded.”
Grants go to HOME participating jurisdictions, competitively, with priority for distressed communities, Opportunity Zones, needs named in a consolidated plan, and places that have cut regulatory barriers to conversion. Section 227(g) lets HUD waive or replace most rules it administers for the pilot, except those on fair housing, nondiscrimination, labor standards and the environment.
Nothing in the section ties an award to a project’s cost, its number of homes or its financing gap. A jurisdiction could win $10 million for one building that needs $2 million. Whether that happens depends on HUD’s Notice of Funding Opportunity and on how each city passes the money on, and neither exists yet. As of October 26, 2026, Congress had appropriated nothing for the pilot and a search of the Federal Register found no RESIDE notice.
Building by building
The excess over the modeled gap is not one large building skewing a total. It runs through most of the list.
One caution first. These 10 buildings are, by definition, the ones whose gap the formula grant covers, so the formula pays each of them at least its gap. The finding is how much more. The median building gets 1.5× its gap, and 4 of the 10 get at least twice. Where the per-home cap binds, a small gap still draws $60,000 for every home.
Modeled RESIDE award and conversion-cost gap (before acquisition), Downtown San Jose, 10 buildings
| Building | Homes | Formula award | Gap | Award ÷ gap | What sets the award |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 121 S Market St | 84 | $5.0M | $0.4M | 13.8× | per-home cap |
| 96 N 3rd St | 57 | $3.4M | $1.3M | 2.6× | per-home cap |
| 233 W Santa Clara St | 126 | $7.6M | $3.4M | 2.3× | per-home cap |
| 210 N 4th St | 60 | $3.6M | $1.8M | 2.0× | per-home cap |
| 150 Almaden Blvd | 177 | $10.0M | $6.6M | 1.5× | $10M cap |
| 111 Almaden Blvd | 111 | $6.7M | $4.5M | 1.5× | per-home cap |
| 111 N Market St | 151 | $9.1M | $6.8M | 1.3× | per-home cap |
| Building 649605 | 57 | $3.4M | $3.0M | 1.1× | per-home cap |
| 152 N 3rd St | 177 | $10.0M | $9.5M | 1.0× | $10M cap |
| 75 E Santa Clara St | 182 | $10.0M | $9.7M | 1.0× | $10M cap |
The formula also takes no account of need. 12 other screened buildings already pencil with no subsidy at all. The same formula would offer them $64.7M if they applied and qualified. Sized to the modeled gap, they would get nothing.
One $10 million grant, at market values
In any year with at least $100 million, the statute caps each grant at $10 million. This illustrates how two ways of dividing one grant differ, using the model's market-value gaps.
Suppose San Jose won a single maximum award and passed it on to these buildings, cheapest per home first. Paid by formula, $10 million covers 1 building and 182 homes. Paid to the gap, it covers 5 buildings and 384 homes, for $9.8M. That is 2.1× as many homes from the same federal dollars.
This is a market-value illustration of allocation rules, not a count of attainable homes a grant would fund. It uses each building’s modeled gap before the affordability adjustment below and before acquisition. A comparison under the affordability rule would mean recalculating every building’s gap first.
The catch: the law requires attainable housing
The model values every home at market rate. RESIDE housing must meet the law's affordability rule, so market values cannot be assumed.
Section 227(a)(1) requires “attainable housing”: homes for households earning up to 120% of area median income, with the majority affordable at 60%. The model behind the San Jose numbers values every finished home at the same market figure, and the site lists that as one of its limits. Here is what it does to this finding.
The law does not set a rent for “affordable,” and HUD has not defined one for the pilot. As a benchmark this page uses the 2026 Multifamily Tax Subsidy Project rent limit at 60% of area median income, the limit tax-credit housing uses: in Santa Clara County, $2,158 a month for a studio and $2,312 for a one-bedroom, including a utility allowance. San Jose’s average asking rent was $2,394 for a studio and $3,009 for a one-bedroom in August 2026, according to Yardi Matrix data published by RentCafe, before utilities. A restricted one-bedroom gives up at least $697 a month.
The formula’s surplus over the gap is $21.8M, about $18K a home. Spread over the 598 homes that would have to be restricted, it is gone once each restricted home is worth $36K less than a market-rate one. At a 5% to 6% capitalization rate, that is a rent cut of about $152 to $182 a month. The one-bedroom difference is about 3.8× that.
The same 10 buildings with most homes held at 60% AMI rents
| Value lost per restricted home | Combined gap | Formula ÷ gap | Still pencil with formula award |
|---|---|---|---|
| None (the model as published) | $47.0M | 1.46× | 10 of 10 |
| $36K (break-even) | $68.8M | 1.00× | 6 of 10 |
| $100K | $106.8M | 0.64× | 1 of 10 |
| $139K ($697/mo at 6%) | $130.3M | 0.53× | 0 of 10 |
| $167K ($697/mo at 5%) | $147.0M | 0.47× | 0 of 10 |
With the one-bedroom rent difference priced in, the formula covers 47% to 53% of the combined gap, and none of the 10 buildings clears the modeled gap with it. The 1.5× holds only if every home is valued at market rate and acquisition is left out.
This is a rough adjustment, not underwriting. It applies the one-bedroom difference to every restricted home, ignores the higher operating costs and the lower financing costs that come with affordable housing, and treats the capitalization rate as an assumption. It counts the full rent difference, times 12 and divided by the capitalization rate, as a permanent cut in net operating income, with no allowance for vacancy, collection loss, changes in expenses or how long the restriction lasts. And it subtracts that income-based figure from the model’s fixed value of $425K a home without reconciling the two valuations. Unit mix, operating income, financing terms and other subsidies could each move the result. It is a sensitivity scenario: under this one-bedroom rent assumption, the formula’s surplus does not cover the larger gaps.
What it means for HUD and for cities
In these San Jose numbers, over-paying at market rents and under-paying at affordable ones trace to one cause: a formula that never looks at the gap.
Paid with no check of need, a share-of-cost formula pays a building for being expensive, not for being short of money. In these numbers it over-pays the buildings closest to penciling and under-pays the ones the affordability scenario pushes furthest from it. That is a case against skipping the needs check, not against formula caps. A program can use both, as HUD already requires elsewhere: underwrite each project to find its gap after every other source, and let the formula’s caps limit the award.
- For layered public money, federal law already says so. 42 U.S.C. 3545(d) bars HUD assistance to a housing project beyond what is necessary after other government assistance. For HOME, 24 CFR 92.250(b) bars a jurisdiction from investing more than is necessary to provide quality affordable housing that is financially viable.
- HUD has not said whether those rules govern RESIDE. The pilot sits in the HOME statute but is not a HOME formula grant, and Section 227(g) lets HUD waive most of its own rules for it. The funding notice should say plainly that awards to projects are sized to an underwritten gap, with the affordability rule in the underwriting and the per-home and per-project caps as limits.
- Cities decide the rest. A grant goes to the jurisdiction. Even under a loose notice, a city can underwrite each building rather than divide an award by formula. In the San Jose numbers above, paying each modeled gap reaches more of the model’s estimated homes from $10 million; it does not guarantee more completed homes.
In San Jose at market values, many modeled gaps are small enough that a grant closes them. Under this page’s affordable-rent scenario, most grow past what a $60,000-a-home award covers, closer to Denver and Philadelphia, where no screened building pencils with the modeled grant even at market values.
What this does not show
- Which buildings qualify. Only vacant and abandoned buildings are eligible: found unsafe by code enforcement, with no corrective action at least 90 days after the owner was notified, or in court-ordered receivership or nuisance abatement related to abandonment, or abandoned as state law defines it. Boston publishes its unsafe-building cases and San Jose does not, and neither publishes receivership or abandonment records, so the model assumes every building qualifies (see which buildings meet the test).
- Acquisition. Every gap here is conversion cost minus completed value. It leaves out buying the building, or the owner’s existing value in it, which RESIDE grants can pay for. So every gap is understated and every surplus overstated.
- HUD’s actual formula. There is none yet. The formula here is the model’s assumption.
- Real underwriting. Costs and values come from a screening model built on footprints and published heights, not from appraisals, bids or lender terms.
- Other cities. In Denver and Philadelphia no screened building pencils with the modeled grant, so there is no over-award to measure there. In Downtown Boston, where the model values a converted home at the market’s $442K average sale price per unit, 72 of 96 screened buildings pencil without a grant and a modeled grant unlocks 8 more; this page sizes awards from the San Jose data only.
Questions
How much is a RESIDE Act grant?
Does the RESIDE Act say how big each project's subsidy should be?
Does a cost-share formula over-award at market values?
Is the over-award real if the housing has to be affordable?
Doesn't HUD already stop over-subsidizing projects?
Has HUD published a RESIDE Notice of Funding Opportunity?
Sources
- U.S. Government Publishing Office, “Public Law 119-101, Section 210”
- Legal Information Institute, “42 U.S.C. 12757, Revitalizing empty structures into desirable environments”
- Legal Information Institute, “42 U.S.C. 3545, HUD accountability (subsection (d), limitation of assistance)”
- Legal Information Institute, “24 CFR 92.250, maximum per-unit subsidy amount, underwriting and subsidy layering”
- California Department of Housing and Community Development, “2026 Multifamily Tax Subsidy Project income and rent limits, effective May 1, 2026”
- RentCafe (Yardi Matrix), “Average rent in San Jose, CA, updated August 31, 2026”
- Federal Register, “HUD documents search”
More on the law: The ROAD to Housing Act explained · Environmental review changes · CDBG and HOME changes · Opportunity Zones · The 2027 Opportunity Zone map · The Innovation Fund · Innovation Fund reforms, city by city · Housing permits in every CDBG city · The Build Now Act · Manufactured housing and the chassis rule · Chassis-free manufactured homes by state · Manufactured home zoning by city · RESIDE Act funding status · Which buildings meet the RESIDE test · The ban on large investors buying homes